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INTRODUCTION 
 
Is there a causal link between ethnic demography, communal violence, local politics 
and terrorism? What factors might prompt a terrorist to choose a target place? Why 
the states like Maharashtra and Mumbai in particular witnessed more terrorist 
attacks in India? It is a question which arises on observing the trend and pattern of 
terrorism in India, particularly when one state, say Maharashtra witnessed more 
number of terrorist attacks than other states.   
While the underlying reason for Mumbai—and generally Maharashtra, being 
targeted due to its well established economic profile could be true, it would also be 
worthwhile to examine other factors to gain more clarity on the subject. If these were 
indeed the sole dictating factors for terrorists to choose their target sites, then why 
other places with similar profile weren’t targeted? Apparently, just assuming that 
Mumbai is targeted because of its above mentioned credentials appears to conceal 
several layers of enquiry about two complex and strategically defined phenomena—
mode of terrorist attack and the choice of target. 
 The literature1 points out that generally terrorist prefer to attack ‘soft targets’ where 
there are large groups of people, that are symbolic and recognizable around the 
world and that will generate maximum media attention when attacked. The attacks 
on World Trade Centre in New York on 11th September 2001, London Underground 
on 7th July 2005 and the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai on 26th November 2008 are 
examples which reinforce the above mentioned assumptions. The terrorists’ hope is 
that if the target meets these criteria, terror magnifiers like the media will help the 
attackers produce a psychological impact that goes far beyond the immediate attack 
site. The best-case scenario for the attackers is that this psychological impact will also 
produce an adverse economic impact against the targeted government at the same 
time leaving a message to target audience/victims. In a sense, it means while they 
want government machinery to suffer they could also go for place that has 
communal tension. Beyond that simple observation, however, there remain several 
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unexamined assumptions and unanswered questions which deserve greater 
analysis.  
This study examines two distinct processes in selecting target (soft targets) of the 
terrorist: the one-time decision to begin attacking targets and then the continued 
attack against such targets. This analysis points to ethnic demography (places 
constituted with one dominant community), simmering communal tension (where 
social fabric was torn apart) and ideology (picking specific religion) as the decisive 
factor in choosing target, while organizational factors such as presence of hardliner 
and their network centrality are related to the number of incidents perpetrated.  
This study uses a rationalist framework to explore why certain places/ states are 
chosen as particular target for the attack. Notably, one of the primary tasks of this 
study is to better understand why states like Maharashtra and in particular Mumbai 
were repeatedly under terrorist attacks. According to a study conducted at NIAS on 
the number of terrorist incidents between March 1993 to December 2010, nearly 70% 
of the attacks took place in the states of Maharashtra, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh 
alone.2 This study attempts to find out the underlying reasons behind such frequent 
occurrence terrorist incidents in Maharashtra.  
1.0. Terrorist target selection methods: A theoretical overview  
Target selection by perpetrators of terrorist acts has been a study which has kept 
academicians, analysts, practitioners of security, and police personnel thinking for 
several years now. Notably, why specific locations are targeted by terrorists groups, 
and time at which these attacks occur, etc. are questions which remain largely 
unresolved and understudied. While the whole idea behind a terrorist act is to 
psychologically impact the civilian targets and the state, another dimension of a 
terrorist act is its unpredictability. By studying patterns of previous attacks, their 
timings, the site locations where such attacks have occurred and assessing its 
economic, demographic and political value, some understanding can be gained on 
the subject. However, making conclusive assessments would be an uphill task and 
challenging given the reliable data constraints. From studies, reports and newspaper 
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writings on the subject some broad understanding could be arrived to understand 
terrorist target selection methods.  
The choices of targets are classified into five categories:  
Economic: Terrorists and terrorist groups’ primary aim in choosing economic targets 
are motivated by the fact that they want to disrupt the economic activities of the 
target state.3 Business houses, commercial establishments, and stock markets are 
symbols of economic infrastructure of any country.4 Disrupting their activities 
through the acts of violence can partially halt activities in these places, thereby 
inflicting economic loss.5 Secondly, when such centres of economic importance are 
attacked it also sends a signal to prospective investors from attempting such 
economic pursuits in the target country.6 Such an act leads to image degradation of 
that country as an investment destination and might in some cases lead to loss of 
possible foreign investments.7  
Demographic: Target locations are often selected by terrorists groups keeping in mind 
certain communities inhabiting in the vicinity of a specific site.8 Here, the underlying 
rationale of such terrorist act is to create fear among such communities for their 
perceived religious or/and political stand.9 Sometimes terrorists groups also target 
such demographic hubs to create communal tensions and chaos. Several case studies 
have demonstrated that an act of terror by a group or individual is followed by 
communal tension in those particular areas. Sites of religious importance also get 
considered as soft targets by terrorist groups.10  
Political: Terrorists groups often chose targets due to the political value it stands for. 
Sometimes constituencies of those political parties who often call for taking a more 
determined counter terrorism policy approach become targets of terrorists groups.  
Military: Military infrastructure/camps/installations often are most common targets 
for terrorist groups. The military of any country is considered as an essential 
instrument of power through which a state exercises its authority to govern and 
enforce policies.11 By targeting these instruments of power,12 the terrorist groups and 
unlawful elements aim to challenge the state and its policies. In view of this factor, 
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the world over military establishments often is the most common targets of such 
unlawful groups.  
Symbolism and philosophy: On the subject of target selection, one study observes that 
terrorist organisations chose targets on the basis of the proposed target’s symbolic 
value and the ability to execute the attack.13 Additionally, the choice of target 
selection for an attack is generally driven by the fundamental beliefs and objective of 
the terrorist group. The nature of targets selected is largely contingent upon the 
terrorist organisation’s tactical and strategic goal.14 For instance, it is observed that 
some targets are chosen given the target’s exposure to greater casualty.15    
1.1. Target categorization and capabilities  
Targets can be classified into civilian and non-civilian categories. While the attacks 
on civilian targets can significantly alter the course of public opinion towards the 
existing policies of the government and could also lead to changes in political 
leadership16 sometime, on the other hand, attacks on non-civilian targets can lead to 
loss of morale among the forces and leadership, erode power capabilities and 
sometime the change of guard in political leadership.  
Some studies have also points out that while terrorist groups intend to target site 
which carry high emotional value, however, the capabilities of the group also plays a 
role in determining the targets.17 Further, the study notes that targets such as public 
transportation systems often get selected given the easy access and escape it offers to 
the perpetrators at the same time with high number of casualties.   
1.2. Objective and Sources for this Assessment 
The study was undertaken in the hope of contributing further to the previous 
observations of NIAS study title “Patterns in Terror Attacks in Urban and Semi-Urban 
India.”18 The study of terrorism is constrained by numerous impediments to data-
gathering. Merely defining terrorist attacks in India as the consequence of Babri 
Masjid demolition or the grand strategy of Pakistan based terror groups may prove 
notoriously piecemeal though they contributed for this menace to an extent. The 
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collection of data on political, socio-economic and demographic profile of the 
affected area is obviously necessitated for in-depth analysis and for drawing 
inference to go beyond clusters analyse. 
Notably, the primary purpose of this study is to develop a better understanding of 
what triggers the perpetrator to choose a symbolic/specific target and why it is 
chosen. The research questions are, therefore:  
 Why there is an increase in terrorist attack in few particular states in India like 
Maharashtra? 
 How do terrorists select their targets? Is there a causal linkage between 
terrorist incidents and local dynamics?  
 Is the demographic, economic and political profile of particular localities spur 
terror groups to choose them as a ‘soft’ target?  
1.3. Data Collection: Structure and Limitations 
This study draws materials/data mostly from open source documents such as press 
reports, assessments by analysts, and a very limited government data such as census 
data, election commission results/data apart from few secondary literatures. One of 
the most problematic issues inherent in this study is that many—if not most—of the 
terrorist attacks that occurred across India have been attributed by media and 
authorities as the handiwork of organisations that are across the border to 
undermine India’s stability and prosperity. Though it is possible that some of these 
attacks were planned as a vengeance for 1992 Babri Masjid or 2002 Gujarat riots by 
the Pakistan based terror groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), or its supported 
domestic groups like Indian Mujahideen (IM) or Students Islamic Movement of 
India (SIMI), but it is difficult to discern the role of the domestic populace who 
perceive that he or she is ‘victimised’ or ‘dismayed with Indian system’ in these 
attacks given the local dynamics and communal tensions.  
Despite some documentation of local’s handiwork in many of these incidents and 
discernible existence of considerable minority populations in the majority of the 
place where terror incidents took place, very little has been examined about the links 
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between communal politics, ethnic demography and terrorism, apart from some 
sporadic journalistic accounts. As such, evidently there is a significant gap in the 
terrorism research and that necessitate the present study. However, one of the major 
impediments in terrorism research is the paucity of reliable and comprehensive 
information that can be obtained through open-source accounts. This dearth of 
information renders it difficult to make assessments on such issues or to validate the 
assessment. 
The scope of the current study is restricted to analysing terrorist events that took 
place in Maharashtra, from 1993 to 2012. Other attacks, including those perpetrated 
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INDIA AND TERRORISM 
 
2.0. An Overview 
Terrorism in India is not new, though witnessed incidents in Kashmir and Punjab, 
etc. even before 1993, but what are unique now are the evolved characteristics and 
the enhanced operational capabilities of the terrorist outfits and their operatives. 
Surprisingly, India is ranked fourth, right behind Iraq which was followed by 
Pakistan and Afghanistan in the number of terrorist activities (excluding Jammu and 
Kashmir) despite the fact it is not a country in conflict.19 B. Raman attributes 
following three events for amplified terrorist incidents in India,20 i.e. a) the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in December 1992.21 b) the incidents of 
communal violence thereafter across the country, particularly in Mumbai 
(Maharashtra), Gujarat, Karnataka, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Assam and Andhra 
Pradesh (where allegations of disproportionate use of force by the security 
establishment is reported)22 and finally, the riots in Gujarat in 2002.23  
Apparently, as per B. Raman, these events contributed for further radicalization 
among Muslim population and incidentally, communal violence were replaced by 
terrorist attacks in the country. The birth of SIMI (Students' Islamic Movement of 
India) and Al Umma, like radical outfits have  in fact aided in organizing pre-
meditated violence and attacks outside Jammu and Kashmir—making pan India—
with the apparent support of groups across the border.  
In short, it can be categorized by arguing that Babri Masjid demolition had 
contributed for raising Islamic fundamentalism in India, whereas Gujarat riots in 
2002 instigated terrorist attacks in India. The Muslim community annoyed with the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid and their resentment stemmed from the perception 
that the Indian political and criminal justice system—police and the judiciary—is 
anti-Muslim. For instances, B Raman argues that the Indian Mujahideen is in a way a 
movement of reprisal terrorism to protest against alleged injustices and excesses 
against the members of the Muslim community.24 
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MAHARASHTRA  
 
3.0. State Profile - Overview 
Maharashtra has emerged as an important progressive state with vital installations, 
places of economic and national importance, contributing significantly to the 
country’s economy. Arable land, skilled labour, abundance of resources as well as its 
location makes it conducive for economic development. Maharashtra comprises of 
35 districts and is divided into 6 revenue divisions.25 Each region is unique in terms 
of geography, climate and culture, etc. Being the centre of all financial activities, 
presence of media houses, host of the flourishing entertainment industry 
(Bollywood), the state capital, Mumbai, enjoys the status of a global city.   
3.1.1. Demographic profile 
According to the Census 2011, the state of Maharashtra ranks second in terms of 
population size (11,23,72,972).26 From the perspective of religion, the data shows that 
the state can be classified as a Hindu majority state (80.2 percent), however, it has a 
significant number of Muslims, Buddhists, Jains and Christians who comprise 10.6 
percent, 6 percent, 1.3 percent and 1 percent respectively.27  
3.1.2. Economic profile 
Maharashtra is one of the fastest growing states in India.28 Mumbai, capital of the 
state is also considered as the financial capital of India and hosts the Reserve Bank of 
India, the country’s premier fiscal policy making institution. Maharashtra also plays 
host to a large number of major corporate houses of the country.29 The state of 
Maharashtra contributes 13% India’s Gross domestic product (GDP).30 The industrial 
and the services sector are major contributors to the state’s revenues.31 Industrially, 
the state of Maharashtra has made rapid advances. Over the past few years, the state 
has witnessed growth of Information technology (IT) & Information Technology 
Enabled Service (ITES) companies in cities like Pune, Mumbai and Nasik.32 
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3.1.3. Political profile 
 The politics of Maharashtra was largely dominated by the Indian National Congress 
(INC) till 1995, when the Shiv Sena and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) combine formed 
a coalition government in the state.33 Later, the state congress leader Sharad Pawar 
in 1999 rebelled against central Congress leadership over the succession issue and 
formed his own political party named, the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP).34 But 
in order to deny political power to the then Shiv Sena-BJP coalition, he formed a 
coalition government with the Indian National Congress at the centre and the state 
in 2004.35 So far, the INC-NCP has successfully formed two successive governments 
in the state. And recently, in 2019, NCP and Shiv Sena through their political alliance 
formed the government at Maharashtra. This is partially due to the fact that the Shiv 
Sena and BJP could not overcome their internal differences.  
Notably, Maharashtra is an extremely active political state, with the presence of a 
number of political parties. It has remained the headquarters for the RSS which is 
known for providing ideological support to the BJP. It also makes the state a 
politically vibrant since there are number of smaller political groups who may not be 
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MICRO LEVEL ANALYSIS 
4.0. Micro Level Analysis of Areas affected by Terrorism  
Of all the terror attacks in post-Babri Masjid demolition period, Mumbai and 
Maharashtra in general has been a constant target. The following statistics (Table 1) 
shows the account of terrorist attacks in Maharashtra: 
Table 1 – Terrorist incidents in Maharashtra 











12 March 1993 Mumbai Serial 
bombs 
13 25736 Commercial and 
Infrastructure 
02 December 2002 Mumbai Single 1 237 Public transport (bus) 
06 December 2002 Mumbai Single 1 NA Public place/ 
restaurant 
27 January 2003 Mumbai Single 1 138 Public places 
13 March 2003 Mumbai Single 1 1239 Public transportation 
(suburb train) 
28 July 2003 Mumbai Single 1 440 Public transport (bus) 
25 August 2003 Mumbai Serial 
bombs 
2 5241 Public places 
21 November 2003 Parbhani Single 1 NA Religious Place 
27 August 2004 Jalna Single 1 NA Religious Place 
11 July 2006 Mumbai Serial 
bombs 
7 20942 Public transportation  
(suburb train) 
08 September 2006 Malegaon Single 1 3743 Religious Place 
29 September 2008 Malegaon Single 1 644 Public Place 
26 November 2008  Mumbai Serial 
bombs 
10 16645 Multiple 
locations 
13 February 2010 Pune Single 1 1746 Shop 
13 July 2011 Mumbai Serial 
bombs 
3 2347 Public/ Market places 
 
 The above statistics apparently reveal an important underlying picture on the 
analysis of terrorism in Maharashtra. All the major terrorist attacks in India and in 
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particular in Maharashtra have occurred after 1992. Notably, March 1993 has become 
the date of importance; to mark the start of terrorism calendar in urban India, 
incidentally began at Maharashtra. One argument is that the dejected Pakistan, 
losing of Kashmir and later East Pakistan coupled with its realization of complexity 
in winning India conventionally had taken advantage of the resentment amongst 
some Indian Muslim communities to create instability in the rest of India outside 
Jammu and Kashmir.48 Without doubt, this initial impetus from the Pakistan 
perhaps had aided the dejected domestic Indian Muslims population to terrorism. 
 
4.1. Targets-Time Configuration 
The fact is that Maharashtra being the hub for commercial and industrial activities of 
the country and additionally, being also the headquarters for major media houses, 
any activity which disturbs the peace and harmony of the state catches the eye of the 
international attention. But is Mumbai or Maharashtra merely being as the financial 
hub of India is responsible for repeated attacks? Do the perpetrators use greater or 
lesser variation in choosing target and when to attack – i.e. the target-time design?  
With the background of socio-economic, political and demographic data of 
Maharashtra, it would be essential to scrutiny the places of terrorist incidents—
micro level analysis of the affected areas—for a better understanding in terms of the 
rationale of choice/target (place) and timing of the terrorist attack to understand the 
casual links between the terrorism, demography and communal politics.  
a) 1993 Mumbai Serial blasts 
Nearly 13 bomb explosions shook the city of Mumbai on 12th March 1993, killing 
about 273 people and injuring about 700. Fisherman's Colony in Mahim causeway, 
Zaveri Bazaar, Plaza Cinema, Century Bazaar, Katha Bazaar, Hotel Sea Rock, Sahar 
Airport, Air India Building, Hotel Juhu Centaur, Worli Bombay Stock Exchange 
Building, Passport Office are the targets of terrorist attack. Then on another blast at 
Matunga station on 29 October 1993, killing two and injuring over 40. These attacks 
are believed to have been carried out in retaliation to the Babri-Masjid demolition on 
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06 December 1992 and the ensuing communal riots that occurred in Mumbai 
between 6-12 December 1992.  








Source: India Today49  
It was the first planned terrorist attack in urban India and particular in Mumbai. 
According to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Dawood Ibrahim Kaksar, 
Tiger Memon and Mohammed Dossa (or known as ‘D company’) were reported to 
be the key conspirators of these attacks.50 Consequently, for the first time it has been 
witnessed that a crime has been communalized through a terror act. In the post-
Babri Masjid demolition, the Mumbai underworlds were purportedly divided along 
the religious lines. Dawood Ibrahim’s underworld goons supposedly wanted to send 
a message to their Hindu rivals, as well as hope to establish their supremacy in 
Mumbai through these attacks.51 According to the Indian authorities, there is a 
possibility of external support from across the border in carrying out these attacks.52  
An analysis of the locations of the 1993 serial blasts reveals that the primary motive 
of the attackers was to target the centres holding economic and business significance 
for the Hindu community. Reportedly, during the 1993 riots, the Muslim community 
were believed to have been the major victims of the riots.53 The locations chosen for 
bomb explosions by terrorists in the 1993 bomb blasts reveals that these were 
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selected keeping in mind their communal, political and economic importance. For 
instance, target areas such as Plaza theatre and Lucky Petrol Pump near the Shiv 
Sena Headquarters are classic examples.54 Targets were carefully chosen by the 
perpetrators of the bomb blasts to paralyze the economic class of Hindus in Mumbai 
and probably to retaliate against members of a political party which had actively 
supported the cause of Ram Janmabhoomi in Ayodhya.55  
In short, the analysis points out that the involvement of local D-company along with 
persisted communal tension since 1962 Jabalpur riots between Hindus and Muslims 
points out  the links between local politics, communal tension and 1993 bombing. 
b) Ghatkopar blasts (in BEST bus) of 2 December 2002  
A bomb explosion took place in a BEST bus in the area of Ghatkopar on 02nd 
December 2002, killing two people and injuring 39 people.56 From the perspective of 
location, it is interesting to note that the attack took place in Ghatkopar, an area of 
Mumbai which has significant presence of Gujarati community. BJP has traditionally 
received tremendous support from this area for several years now.57 This makes the 
suburb of Ghatkopar a very natural choice for terrorists’ to strike, given its 
demographic and political profile58 as well the timing to coincide the anniversary of 
Babri Masjid demolition.  
In the year 2012, the police arrested Siddiqui Taj Ul Islam Kazi, an accussed in the 
Ghatkopar Bomb blast case of 2002.59 Siddiqui Taj Ul Islam Kazi had assumed a fake 
name and was working in a software company in Hyderabad for 10 years.60 The 
arrested person is also member of the banned organisation SIMI.61 Reportedly, the 
prosecution had alleged that the accused plotted the terrorist attack to avenge the 
post-Godhra riots in Gujarat.62 Confessions of terrorists arrested for different 
terrorism related cases have revealed that they were victims of communal violence 
and that was in a way motivated to go for the attack.63 Thus, the Ghatkopar incident 
points out that there is a linkage between the ethnic demography (target place is 
Gujarati dominated area), internal local politics (BJP bastion) and the terrorist attack. 
In short, it demonstrates the choice of the target-timing configuration. 
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c) Mumbai Central Station Blast of 06 December 2002 
An explosion occurred inside a restaurant—McDonald's outlet—in Mumbai Central 
Railway station injuring 25 people on 06th December 2002.64 From the perspective of 
both timing and location, it is interesting to note that the choice of bomb explosion 
coincided with the 10th anniversary of Babri Masjid demolition, as well as the fact 
that the area of Mumbai Central Railway station is reported to be considered a 
minority dominated one.65 And incidentally, McDonald outlets are being 
prominently visited by people from upper social strata. From this, it can be 
extrapolated that the perpetrators of the attack chose to trigger the explosion to 
probably stoke communal feelings in the neighbourhood.  
d) Vile Parle blasts of 27 January 2003  
A bomb explosion occurred in Vile Parle, an area in Western Mumbai, killing one 
and injuring 25 people.66 Vile Parle, a suburb of Mumbai with a significant presence 
of Gujarati community, could have possibly been targeted owing to its demographic 
profile.67 The landslide victory of Narendra Modi of BJP in December 2002 Gujarat 
assembly polls election too could possibly be a reason for the timing and choice of 
target.  
e) Mulund Train Blasts of 13 March  2003 
A bomb explosion occurred in Mulund station, inside a train bound for Karjat from 
CST killing 12 people.68 It would be interesting to note here that this particular bomb 
blasts coincided with the 10th anniversary of the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts. Possibly, 
it could also be a test run for later 11 July 2006 attacks on Mumbai suburban trains. 
The local demography analysis reveals that Mulund’s population stands at 330,195 
(according to 2001 census) and it has been dominated by Hindus, particularly 
Gujarati community.69 Also, incidentally, Shiv Sena and Maharashtra Navnirman 
Sena are very active in the Mulund region. It may be infer that the area chosen by the 
perpetrators by again keeping in mind the local politics and communal situation 
prevailing in the city.  
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f) Ghatkopar bus Blast of 28 July 2003 
A bomb explosion occurred inside a BEST bus in Ghatkopar, and it was considered 
to be one of the most powerful witnessed in the city and has reportedly claimed the 
lives of four and injuring many in the vicinity of the blast site.70 It was the second 
blast in Ghatkopar. The area is densely populated and witnesses heavy vehicular 
traffic on Lal Bahadur Shastri Marg. According to the media reports, bomb was 
placed on one of the back seats of BEST bus number MH031240 commuting from 
Andheri to Ghakopar.71 And as per the Maharashtra Police, the modus operandi 
used for the attack was similar to the explosion carried out by terrorists during the 
bus attack in Ghatkopar on 02nd December 2002.72  
There is a considerable belief that this was the result of disturbing undercurrent of 
possible retribution against Mumbai's Gujarati community after the Gujarat riot. 
Notably, the frequency of minor communal conflicts may not have increased 
significantly after Gujarat riots, but seems divisions on communal lines have become 
deeper in Maharashtra, particularly, around places like Ghatkopar. Reportedly, in 
the words of the accused terrorist Umar, “Gujarat and the unabashed prejudice that 
followed was a breaking point.”73 He further noted that “if the government 
continues on this path, we will go to any extreme,” he warns. “As they reach their 
peak, so will we.”74  
In shorts, the "element of continuity" from the previous blasts was undeniable. Also, 
Ghatkopar has been disproportionately targeted and affected by sectarian violence 
too. Police sources had pointed out that the explosion was meant to create a panic 
(terror) during the run up of Kumbh Mela that was to be held at Nashik on 1st 
August 2003.75  
g) Mumbai blasts of 25 August 2003 
On 25 August 2003, two bomb fitted cars exploded near the Gateway of India and 
the Zaveri Bazaar.76 Examination of the two locations reveals that perhaps the 
terrorists selected these areas considering their economic and demographic 
importance. For instance, Gateway of India is a major tourist spot in Bombay, often 
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frequented by foreign tourists. Zaveri Bazaar is a major jewellery hub in the city of 
Mumbai and has a significant presence of traders belonging to the Gujarati 
community.77  
Two observable grounds can be noticed on the selection of this target and its timing. 
First, the accused Ashrat Ansari, Haneef Sayyed, and Fahmeeda confessed that they 
committed the terrorist attack as an emotional response to the Gujarat communal 
riots.78 Second, from the choice of locations chosen by the terrorists, it seems that the 
attacks were largely aimed at giving twin blow to the economy of Mumbai as well as 
hurt the Gujarati community in the city.79 Finally, occasion of India’s Independence 
Day could be a ground for timing of the attack as terrorists are normally seeking 
opportunities to trigger terror strikes during such occasions of national importance.  
h) Parbhani blasts of 21 November 2003 
A bomb blast occurred in the Mohamadia mosque in Parbhani district of 
Maharashtra, injuring 31 people.80 In the aftermath of the bomb blasts, a curfew was 
imposed by the city police.81 According to 2011 census data, Muslims constituted 
25% of the Parbhani’s population.82 The nearest major city is Aurangabad, which 
also has considerable amount of Muslims population. Both Parbhani and 
Aurangabad are communally sensitive cities. Later, it has been observed from the 
Malegaon blast (2006) investigations that some members from the Hindu right-wing 
terror cells were involved in the incident as a reaction to hardline Muslim group 
SIMI sponsored terrorism in Maharashtra.83 However, all the four accused in 2003 
Parbhani Masjid blast case were acquitted by Parbhani district court owing to lack of 
evidence in 2016.84 
i) Jalna blasts of 27 August 2004 
On 27th August 2004, some unidentifiable people riding on motorcycle threw bombs 
on a crowd offering prayers inside the Kadriya mosque in Jalna, injuring five 
people.85 Like in Parbhani, the bomb blasts were followed by armed clashes among 
people thereby compelling the local administration to impose curfew in the area.86 
As per the Census 2011 data, the population of Jalna district stands at 19,58,483.87 
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Like the Parbhani blast, initial evidence from the investigation points to the role of 
Hindu right wing terror cells,88 but the Jalna district and session’s court acquitted all 
the seven accused due to lack of evidence in 2012.89  
j)  Mumbai Suburban Railway Attack of 11 July 2006 
On 11th July 2006, a series of seven bomb explosions occurred in local trains of 
Mumbai within a span of 11 to 15 minutes, killing 209 people and injuring 80090 (see 
table & Map below). Reportedly, it is suspected by the investigating agencies that 
this attack was similar to previous explosions carried out by terrorists in 1993, 2002 
and 2003.91 The bombs were placed inside pressure cookers and kept in bag and 
were left to be detonated in the first class train compartments.92 From the placement 
of bombs inside the first class compartments on the trains, it could be inferred that 
the target of the perpetrators were the upper middle class of Mumbai. 
Coincidentally, the Mumbai train bombings also occurred on the same day of 11 July 
Srinagar bombings.93 
Table 2 – Location & the timing of Bomb Blast in Mumbai Suburban Rail, 2006 
Blast location Train Coach type Time  
Khar Road Travelling north from 
Churchgate 
First Class 06.24 p.m. 
Bandra Fast Local Churchgate -
Borivali 
First Class 06.24 p.m. 
Jogeshwari Slow Local Churchgate -
Borivali 
First Class 06.25 p.m. 
Mahim Junction Fast Local Churchgate -
Borivali 
First Class 06.26 p.m. 
Mira Road –
Bhayandar 
Travelling north from 
Churchgate 
First Class 06.29 p.m. 
Matunga Road  Fast Local Churchgate - Virar First Class 06.30 p.m. 
Borivali Fast Local Churchgate - Virar First Class 06.35 p.m. 
  Total 11 minutes 
Source: Compiled from various newspaper reports 
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Source: NBCNEWS94  
It is worthwhile to ascertain the socio-economic, political and demographic details of 
each target place/suburb where the blasts took place.  
(i) Khar Road : 
Khar is considered to be one of the most important suburbs of Mumbai. It 
appears that the area has a sizeable presence of migrants from different states of 
India95 Apart from Sikhs; Gujaratis are one of the most prominent communities 
in Khar. 
(ii) Bandra: 
Bandra is considered to be one of the most affluent and cosmopolitan suburbs of 
Mumbai and is inhabited by Christians, Muslims, Zoroastrians and Hindus.96 The 
place is dotted by shopping malls, posh restaurants and buildings, where some 
are owned by the Gujarati community too. It is possible that the presence of an 
affluent, cosmopolitan crowd97 could have possibly been an important factor for 
perpetrators of the attack to choose Bandra.  
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(iii) Jogeshwari: 
This suburb of Mumbai witnessed some turbulence during the riots of 1993. 
Given the presence of a sizeable Maharashtrian population with Gujaratis, Shiv 
Sena has commanded good support in this suburb.98 Additionally, it is reported 
that the famous Goddess Jogeshwari temple, which is considered to be a deity for 
some Gujarati Brahmins99 is also located in this locality. 
(iv) Mahim Junction: 
The population of Mahim comprises of local Maharashtrians, Gujaratis, 
Marwaris, Muslims and Christians.100 The place is well known for the Mahim 
Church and Mahim Darga. Given its profile of being a Shiv Sena stronghold,101 
Mahim could have possibly been chosen by terrorists for the attack.  
(v) Mira-Bhayandar 
Mira bhayander is an important suburb in the city of Mumbai. Demographically, 
the suburb has a substantial presence of Gujarati,102  Marwari and North Indian 
population.  
(vi) Matunga Road: 
Matunga is considered to be one of the most prominent South Indian localities of 
Mumbai.103 It is also host to several South Indian restaurants of the city  
(vii) Borivali: 
Borivali has a sizeable number of Gujarati populations. Moreover, given the fact 
that BJP has a considerable support base in this suburb, it could have possibly 
figured in the calculation of terrorists to strike here.  
Four major rationales can be stated for the July 2006 attacks. One, it could be 
possibly a way of avenging the serious convictions of about 25 Muslims in Gujarat 
for the 2002 riots.104 Two, the serial blast could be the possible consequences of 
renewed riots at Baroda in Gujarat which took place in May 2006 following the 
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demolition of dargah of Chishti Rashduddin.105 Third, it to some extent coincided 
with the fourth anniversary of 29 July 2003 Ghatkopar Blast in BEST bus. 
k) Malegaon blasts of 08 September 2006  
The town of Malegaon has witnessed a series of bomb explosions as well as 
communal riots in 2006 and then in 2008. The first one took place on 08th September 
2006, killing 37 people and injuring over 100 when a series of coordinated bomb 
explosions occurred in a Muslim cemetery, adjacent to Hamidia mosque in Bada 
Kabaristan area.106 The bomb explosions took place in the aftermath of Friday 
prayers on the Shab e Bara'at holy day.107 The National Investigation Agency (NIA) 
arrested Swami Aseemanand in 2011 in connection with the 08 September 2006 
Malegaon bombing.108 Further, reports suggest that the NIA also arrested accused 
Mohan, who is believed to have taken part in the conspiracy and planted explosives 
in Malegaon.109 It was reported that Swami Aseemanand confessed in front of 
magistrate and stated that a Hindu group was behind the bombings in Malegaon.110 
Meanwhile, another bomb blast took place on 29th September 2008, at Bhikhu 
Chowk in Malegaon, killing 6 and injuring 70.111  
According to reports, a probe by Anti Terrorism Squad of Maharashtra Police 
revealed the involvement of members of right wing organisation ‘Abhinav 
Bharat.’112 However, it must be noted that the charges against the accused in the 
Malegaon blasts case of 2008 were dropped on December 2017.113 
The analyses of this Malegaon blasts based on available public information reveals 
that Malegaon (target) was chosen after careful consideration keeping in mind the 
dominance of Muslims population.114 The explosions on Shab e Bara'at holy day 
indicates the timing of the attack as possibly to avenge to Islamic terrorists attack on 
Mumbai.  
l) Mumbai attack of 26 November 2008 (26/11) 
The city of Mumbai witnessed one of the worst possible terrorist attacks in the 
history when the terrorists from across the border entered it through the sea route 
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and began shooting at pre-determined targets in the city115 on the night of 26 
November 2008. It was reported about ten Pakistan-based terrorists were part of this 
terrorist attacks that killing 166 people and injuring over 300 people.116 From the 
reports, it is clear that the reconnaissance of each target was done by terrorists before 
striking. The targets were Hotel Taj, Hotel Oberoi and Trident, Leopold Cafe, 
Chabad House, CST station, and Cama Hospital.117  
Evidently, Mumbai looks natural choice for the sea borne terrorist, given its tag of 
‘global city’ and being in the west close to Pakistan coast. Besides, Mumbai might 
consider as a good choice for the operation as the perpetrators could get access easily 
and exit too on completion, if in case not caught or killed can quickly get into the 
waters to escape.  
From the choice of targets, it is clear that the intention of terrorists was to create an 
international sensation. The two hotels mentioned here are known for hosting 
visiting foreign tourists in the city.118 Similarly, the Chabad House which houses 
Jewish religious representatives was chosen for its economic value.119 The 
indiscriminate firing pursued by the Pakistani terrorists’ points to the fact that the 
aim was also to target a cross-section of population in the city and cripple the 
transportation infrastructure of the city.  
It took the combined efforts of the National Security Guard, Mumbai Police, Army 
columns and Marine commandos to neutralize them. In the end, police captured 
lone terrorist Ajmal Kasab, killing other terrorist.120 
Unlike the other terror attacks from 1993 to 2011 that took place in Mumbai and 
Maharashtra, where the local groups involvement is evident with local agenda, the 
26/11 attacks was choreographed by Pakistan based terrorist members with some 
elements of support from local militant groups with the agenda of targeting of 
commuter centre, business establishment, Westerners and Jewish community.  
 
 
National Institute of Advanced Studies | 22 
m) Pune German Bakery blasts of 13 February 2010 
On 13th February 2010, a bomb blast occurred in German Bakery, a famous joint 
located in Koregaon park area of Pune, which killed 17 people including five 
foreigners.121 Perusal of reports suggests that German bakery is located in close 
proximity to the Jewish Chabad House and the Osho Ashram.122 Possible presence of 
foreigners in both Chabad House and Osho Ashram might have been an important 
rationale for terrorists to choose the German bakery as a target. And given the 
presence of Chabad house and the presence of foreigners, Osho Ashram was 
possibly chosen by the perpetrators of the attack.123 Reports indicate that the little 
known terrorists groups such as namely Laskhar-e-Taiba Al Alami and the 
Mujahideen Islami Muslim Front have claimed responsibility for executing the 
explosion in German bakery.124 From the perspective of timing of the attack, it could 
be inferred that it could also have been possibly planned as a response to the 1st 
anniversary of the filing of charge sheet against captured Pakistani terrorist, Ajmal 
Kasab in the court.125  
According to a report from the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), the material used 
for making the explosive was a combination of RDX, ammonium nitrate and 
petroleum hydrocarbon oil (ANFO).126 Reportedly, accused Mohsin Chowdhary 
resident of Manishanagar Complex in Kondhwa, Pune was a key conspirator of the 
attack.127 And again reports suggest that Mohsin Chowdhary is also a close 
acquaintance of Iqbal Bhatkal.128   
n) Mumbai Bombings of 13 July 2011 
On 13th of July 2001, the city of Mumbai witnessed bomb explosions at three 
different places, Zaveri Bazaar, Diamond House and Kabutarkhana, killing 23 and 
injuring 131.129 From the perspective of locations of the attacks, it could yet again be 
inferred that the perpetrators of the attacks chose the targets keeping in kind their 
economic and demographic importance.130 The first two targets i.e. Zaveri Bazaar 
and Diamond House are well known for their economic importance131 and the 
presence of Gujarati traders. The third target, i.e. Kabutarkhana area in Dadar, which 
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in addition to being a crowded place is also an area where Hindus are believed to 
come to feed the pigeons.132 From the perspective of timing of the attack, it could be 
inferred that the date coincided with the fifth anniversary of attacks in Mumbai 
suburban trains of 11th July 2006133 and with the Kashmir Martyr’ Day, which was 
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KEY OBSERVATIONS 
5.0. Key Observations 
The demolition of Babri Masjid may be the origin of terrorist incidents away from 
Kashmir in urban India, but 1993 Mumbai terrorist incidents were mainly said to be 
based on “business and communal objective” of the Bombay underworld dons. 
However, the terror attacks after 2000 particularly from December 2002 blasts in 
Mumbai were apparently launched with new intent i.e. ‘attack against Hindus, 
particularly revenge against Gujaratis’ for the said anti-Muslim riots at Gujarat.135  
Interestingly, terrorist had chosen Mumbai and Maharashtra in general than Gujarat 
for their revenge against Gujaratis. Understandably, it may be due to two factors. 
One, evidently Maharashtra had the presence of strong terror network including 
banned SIMI and underworld crime groups. The presence of banned organization 
like the SIMI provided significant logistic for the perpetrator. Two, the periodic 
communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims in the state added zeal for the 
perpetrators to choose it, as Maharashtra is communally a very sensitive, 
particularly the places like Bhivandi, Aurangabad and Malegaon, etc. are 
communally sensitive towns at all times.  
Three, the inflammatory speech of Shiva Sena coupled with the presence of affluent 
Gujarati people who controls many business establishments in Mumbai and 
Maharashtra136 in general perhaps invited attention of the terrorist groups. It has 
also been claimed that the Mumbai serial blasts was direct fallout of the Gujarat riots 
of 2002.137  In Mumbai, Gujaratis are the second largest linguistic community; and 
command significant influence over the city’s business and economic activities.138  
While target selection is based on the demographic, economic, and political factors, 
in case of timing of these attacks, it may be noted that the attack dates often coincide 
with anniversaries of significant developments or communal events in the country. 
For instance, the terrorist attacks that Mumbai witnessed in the year 2002 coincided 
with the 10th anniversary of the demolition of Babri Masjid in 1992.139 Similarly, 
some attacks which occurred in Mulund on 14th March 2003 coincided with the 10th 
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anniversary of the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts.140 Equally, the bomb blasts that took 
place in Mumbai in the year 2011 coincided with the fifth-year anniversary of the 
July 2006 Mumbai suburban train bombing attacks.141  
In some cases, certain attacks were also timed as an immediate reaction to important 
developments in political, religious or policy developments. For instance, the 
German bakery bomb blasts of 2010 coincided with the filing of chargesheet against 
Pakistani terrorist Ajmal Kasab.142  
In short, it can be inferred that terrorist incidents in Maharashtra can be classified 
into three category, one, post-Babri Masjid effect, two, consequence of Gujarat riots 
and third, the reactionary violence of hardline Hindu groups against the hardline 
Muslim group sponsored terrorism. Equally, the analysis points out that there seems 
to be clear connection between ethnic demography, and communal violence and 
local politics. The choices of target place selection are apparently based on above 
factors and timing too seems deliberated one. 
Incidentally, terrorism related incidents in Maharashtra have dramatically decreased 
since 2012 even though some other part of India’s hinterland had witnessed a few 
incidents. Although it needs further study to find out exactly what brought this 
change, at the surface level it appears perhaps combination of multiple reasons for 
the decline. They are: one, the increased focus and investigation of Maharashtra 
Counter Terrorism Police and NIA on the earlier events perhaps have averted the 
further plans of the perpetrators in the state. Two, the killing and arrest of many of 
the known terrorist elements like Bhatkal Brothers and others in the country could 
lead to the decline. Finally, in the post-26/11, the amount of embarrassment Pakistan 
has faced globally may have forced its terrorist groups to avoid further operations in 
India’s hinterland like Maharashtra coupled with the international sanctions and 
black listing of terrorist by the United Nations could be the another reasons.  
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INFERENCE 
6.0. Inference 
The examination of all terrorism related incidents in Maharashtra indicates that 
perpetrators have chosen the sites for their attacks based on its economic value, 
perceived political importance, demographic sensitivities and, ease of operation and 
exit. As far as the timing of the incidents are concerned most of them revolved 
around certain political and security events in the country.  
Economic Factor: On the economic front it may be noted here that from 2005-2006, 
India’s economy witnessed a substantial growth rate.143 Within India’s growth story, 
the state of Maharashtra and the city of Mumbai has historically occupied an 
important position.144 The terrorist attacks on Mumbai’s suburban trains were 
probably chosen to cripple the economy and portray India as an unsafe destination 
for investments. The repeated attacks on Mumbai’s suburban train system in 2006, 
2008 Mumbai attacks, and the 2011 serial blasts in Mumbai seems validates this 
interpretation.145 For instance, news reports suggest that incidentally only the first 
class compartments of Mumbai suburban trains were targeted by terrorists during 
the Mumbai train bombings of 2006.146 Equally, Zaveri Bazaar, an area where 
diamond businessmen of the city conduct their transactions has been repeatedly 
targeted.147 Similarly, in the case of 26/11 Mumbai attacks, barring the attacks on 
Jewish Chabad House and Cama Hospital, all the other locations of attacks held 
economic significance.  
Political Significance: In some cases, terrorists groups have chosen targets which 
were perceived to be strongholds of those political parties which had insisted on 
taking a firm view towards counter terrorism or known for inflammatory speech. 
Some of the targeted sites of the 1993 Mumbai blasts indicated their political 
importance148 what was perceived may be by the perpetrators as constituencies of a 
political party which had actively voiced its support in favour of the demolition of 
Babri Masjid. The analysis of the location of the targets in Mumbai shows that 
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targets were chosen keeping in mind the political constituencies of parties that 
supported the demolition.149  
Some targets also carry an international component. For instance, it is argued that 
one plausible reason for the 26/11 Mumbai attacks was possibly meant to derail the 
gradually improving bilateral relations between India and Pakistan150 or India’s 
global standing Similarly, in some cases, areas like the Jewish Chabad House which 
was targeted by terrorists during the 26/11 attacks probably in a way harming the 
improving bilateral relations between India and Israel.151 Another interpretation 
could also be that terrorist groups wanted to send a message to Israel to stop their 
cooperation with India on security and counter-terrorism issues.152 India’s political 
and security relations with Israel had witnessed a positive momentum since the last 
15 years.153  
Tourism: Some targets also seem to have been chosen for their profile of being hubs 
for local and foreign tourists.154 For instance, the Leopold cafe and the Gateway of 
India in Mumbai and German bakery in Pune are very popular spots among 
foreigners.155 The underlying rationale for choosing these sites may be to portray a 
negative and unsafe image about India among the foreigners. Also, the study 
demonstrates that the choice of targets  between 1993 to 2006  were largely keeping 
Indian component, while post 2006 incidents shows the  international component in 
selection of the targets. For instance, the 2008 Mumbai attacks wherein hotels with 
substantial foreigners’ presence was the target, and similarly, Chabad House in 
Mumbai,156 the bomb explosion in Gateway of India in 2011, and the German bakery 
blasts of 2010, etc. prove that target selection of the terrorist was also aimed at 
visiting foreigners in the country.157  
Demography and religion: In some cases, sites were also chosen by terrorists 
keeping in mind their demographic and religious importance. In case of 
Maharashtra, several such attack sites seem to have been chosen based on their 
demographic or religious importance. For instance, most attacks which took place in 
Maharashtra in the year 2002-2003, were influenced due to demographic or political 
factors, such as demolition of Babri Masjid.158 Many targeted locations had a history 
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of   political and communal tensions, which also shows that the target selection 
methods in some incidents, the terror suspects who were arrested for the series of 
bombings in Maharashtra confessed that their decision to embrace the path of 
terrorism was influenced by the communal tensions like Godhra riots. From these it 
could be inferred that the choice of location for such attacks were also possibly 
influenced by these events. The terrorist groups seem to have often targeted areas 
perceived to be hubs of Gujarati community159 such as Ghatkopar, Vile Parle, Zaveri 
Bazar, as a revenge for the riots that took place in Gujarat.160 Similarly, 
Kabutarkhana which was built and frequented by Gujarati Jains is another example 
of a site chose by terrorist groups for its demographic importance.161 
The communal violence, from time to time, since British rule “although the number 
of incidents may vary,”162 the intensity and nature of this violence have become 
more organised and paved way for terrorist incidents. Incidentally, these are said to 
be the result of state’s apathy towards minority communities to an extent as 
perceived by the perpetrators who have stated the state’s indifferences towards their 
community in the previous communal violence have given them an impetus to go 
for terrorist attacks. Perhaps, most terrorist acts are carried out in a locality or a 
region where the minority community is perceived to be “victimised” or at the 
locality where some undercurrent communal uneasiness prevails.  
Ease of operation and ease of exit: The mixed proposition of religious 
groups/communities in the Mumbai city in particular and the Maharashtra state in 
general seems to be  a blessing for the perpetrators as it aids in finding the safe 
shelter and logistics before and after the incident. Two, their local underground 
network or contacts can carried out easily what they want with the abundant 
availability of funds with the Mumbai underground network which adds incentive 
to their mission. Besides, the fact is that Maharashtra is contiguous to the region in 
neighbouring Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh where the 
Islamic and Hindu hardline outfits are known to have a strong presence is of 
considerable significance in terms of ease of exit and go undetected. 
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In short, perpetrators seem to have done rationally costs and benefits calculation 
while selecting targets as they have chosen targets that have witnessed some 
communal skirmish at the local level or dominated by specific communities like 
Guajarati. Also, the inference from the analysis illustrates that terror groups choose 
targets strategically to maximize their political influence or to neutralise the 
opponent power, largely determined by the political institutions set in place and at 
the same time gives them concealing ground.  
While target selection is based on the demographic, economic, and political factors, 
in case of timing of these attacks, it may be noted that the attack dates often coincide 
with anniversaries of significant developments in the country. The timings of attacks 
are mostly dictated by the important anniversaries of significant communal events in 
the country. For instance, the terrorist attacks that Mumbai witnessed in the year 
2002 coincided with the 10th anniversary of the demolition of Babri Masjid in 
1992.163 Similarly, some attacks which occurred in Mulund on 14th March 2003 
coincided with the 10th anniversary of the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts.164 Similarly, the 
bomb blasts that took place in Mumbai in the year 2011 coincided with the fifth-year 
anniversary of the July 2006 Mumbai suburban train bombing attacks.165  
In some cases, certain attacks were also timed as an immediate reaction to important 
developments in terms of political, religious or policy developments. For instance, 
the German bakery bomb blasts of 2010 coincided with the filing of chargesheet 
against Pakistani terrorist Ajmal Kasab.166  
Finally, some important trends are noticeable in the post-Babri period. One, the 
transition of communal violence to communal terrorism is the first evident as the 
communal riots that occurred before the Babri Masjid issue was not planned. The 
post–Babri Masjid scenario has changed the facets of communal violence in India; 
spontaneous violence has been overtaken by planned terrorism.167 Maharashtra, 
which was known for underworld groups, has become a safe haven for terrorists, 
and reportedly they have started operating from there. 
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